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H13-621 HCNP Storage CUSN (Constructing Unifying Storage Network)

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HCNP Storage CUSN (Constructing Unifying Storage Network)
Huawei (Constructing study tips
Killexams : Huawei (Constructing study tips - BingNews https://killexams.com/pass4sure/exam-detail/H13-621 Search results Killexams : Huawei (Constructing study tips - BingNews https://killexams.com/pass4sure/exam-detail/H13-621 https://killexams.com/exam_list/Huawei Killexams : Why Indonesia Has Embraced Huawei

China is neither liked nor trusted in Indonesia. Yet Chinese tech firms—particularly Huawei and ZTE—have become trusted cybersecurity partners for the country. They provide the tech and the training for much of the workforce and the government officials charged with Indonesia’s cybersecurity. These Chinese tech successes in Indonesia offer sobering lessons for the United States, its allies, and its partners—not just in Indonesia, with a population of more than 270 million, but in the broader Indo-Pacific as well.

Unless policymakers in Washington take some pages from the Huawei and ZTE playbook, these Chinese tech titans will not face any serious competition as they maneuver to train vast swaths of the 21st century’s digital workforce. After all, the United States and its allies and partners have for years been in the business of walling themselves off from the perceived security vulnerabilities of dependence on Chinese technology.

Starting in the early 2010s, staunch U.S. allies such as Australia began limiting Huawei’s involvement in critical information communications technology infrastructure. This eventually culminated in strong restrictions—and sometimes outright exclusions—for Huawei and its peers such as ZTE.

China is neither liked nor trusted in Indonesia. Yet Chinese tech firms—particularly Huawei and ZTE—have become trusted cybersecurity partners for the country. They provide the tech and the training for much of the workforce and the government officials charged with Indonesia’s cybersecurity. These Chinese tech successes in Indonesia offer sobering lessons for the United States, its allies, and its partners—not just in Indonesia, with a population of more than 270 million, but in the broader Indo-Pacific as well.

Unless policymakers in Washington take some pages from the Huawei and ZTE playbook, these Chinese tech titans will not face any serious competition as they maneuver to train vast swaths of the 21st century’s digital workforce. After all, the United States and its allies and partners have for years been in the business of walling themselves off from the perceived security vulnerabilities of dependence on Chinese technology.

Starting in the early 2010s, staunch U.S. allies such as Australia began limiting Huawei’s involvement in critical information communications technology infrastructure. This eventually culminated in strong restrictions—and sometimes outright exclusions—for Huawei and its peers such as ZTE.

But for much of the developing world, the story could not be more different.

With a few notable exceptions including Vietnam and India, the developing world still welcomes Chinese tech companies as providers of sorely needed communications infrastructure and training. Huawei and ZTE have experienced among their warmest embraces in Indonesia. First entering the Indonesian market in the late 1990s and early 2000s, these companies have emerged as integral suppliers both of Indonesia’s essential communications infrastructure and the training that will empower the workforce of the country’s booming digital economy. Huawei, for example, already has by a wide margin the largest share of Indonesia’s telecom carrier equipment market.

As with many other developing countries, the relatively low price point of Huawei and ZTE kits is a big part of the appeal. By some estimates, Chinese communications infrastructure is as much as 30 percent cheaper than its competitors’.

Yet in setting out to document how senior Indonesian government officials approach the risks of technological reliance on Chinese companies for our new report, Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia, we found that the reasons for the expansive role of China’s tech companies are more complex and numerous than price point. As our interviews with a wide range of Indonesian officials and experts made plain, Chinese tech companies are seen as partners to both realize Indonesia’s big digital economy goals and navigate its daunting cybersecurity challenges.

Although the digital economy is central to the Indonesian government’s plans for catapulting the country into the top 10 global economies by 2030, the country also faces a massive skills shortage in the field of information communications technology, with the World Bank projecting that it will need 9 million additional such workers by 2030.

Meanwhile, Indonesia is among the countries most vulnerable to cyberattacks globally. According to Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency, the country experienced 1.4 billion cyberattacks or web traffic anomalies in 2021. In 2017, when the number of cyberattacks was closer to 200 million, they were estimated to have cost the country $34.2 billion.

Despite deep suspicion of Chinese tech companies among rich liberal democracies, Huawei and ZTE have presented themselves as the solution to Indonesia’s twin challenges of an impending tech skills shortfall and pervasive cyberattacks.

In 2020, Huawei pledged to train 100,000 Indonesians in essential digital skills, including cloud computing and 5G. Despite the ambitiousness of the move, Huawei is backing its pledges with resources.

We found that Huawei is partnering with local Indonesian universities to offer free short courses and certifications in app development and other key skills. One Indonesian academic we spoke to shared emails showing that Huawei is expanding its outreach by seeking to partner with more local universities and education providers.

Huawei is offering training to the Indonesian government as well, with the company reportedly having trained 7,000 officials since 2019. Indonesia has long been a victim of China’s sophisticated cyber-espionage. Despite this, Indonesia sees the training offered by Chinese tech companies as a solution to many of the country’s most severe cybersecurity challenges.

For Indonesia, the threat of state-based cyber-espionage is far down the list of security concerns when compared to cybercrime committed by nonstate actors, misinformation, and disinformation. In addition to financial losses for Indonesian companies and identity theft and fraud for ordinary Indonesians, these threats endanger the country’s social and political stability.

With Chinese tech companies offering the training, technology, and security practices to reduce vulnerabilities to cybercrime committed by nonstate actors and the skills and technology needed to manage the information domain, the Indonesian government sees firms like Huawei as partners. As a testament to this, the country’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency signed a memorandum of understanding with Huawei on cybersecurity capacity building in 2019. This agreement was then upgraded to a three-party agreement with a leading Indonesian technology institute in 2021.

For the United States or Australia, the notion that a cybersecurity agency would sign such an agreement with Huawei might seem absurd—especially considering that the Chinese government can compel Chinese companies to assist with its intelligence efforts.

But for Indonesia, these concerns about state security are trumped by the training and technology benefits that companies like Huawei provide. As one senior Indonesian government official said to us: “If we’re constantly afraid, our development will stagnate.”

If the United States and its allies and partners want to compete with China in developing countries such as Indonesia, then, much like Huawei, they need to get themselves in the business of offering tangible benefits that respond to real needs.

The U.S. government should partner with its leading tech companies to offer free or at least highly subsidized technical training programs in Indonesia and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific. As well as subjecting the offerings from Chinese companies to some healthy competition, such initiatives would be welcomed by key U.S. allies and partners.

Countries such as Japan, Australia, and India are similarly concerned about the rise of Chinese tech companies across the Indo-Pacific and would strongly support such a U.S. initiative. Moreover, these countries could bolster such a U.S.-led effort by providing additional know-how, funding, and technology. Such a so-called minilateral initiative could also potentially be rolled into exiting Quad efforts to provide more public goods in the Indo-Pacific.

Rhetoric from the United States and like-minded countries about the rules-based international order and a free and open Indo-Pacific isn’t bad. But it won’t persuade developing countries to turn down tangible benefits like technology and training. To shift decision-making in Jakarta and elsewhere, Washington will need to step up with technology and training offers that provide a more appealing value proposition.

None of this is to say that strategic competition with China is the only reason for offering tech training programs in Indonesia and other developing countries in the Indo-Pacific.

Helping to upskill future generations of tech workers in the region is an unambiguously good thing. Many Indo-Pacific countries and their young populations will need these skills to realize their development goals in the global economy’s digital future.

But as well as the clear development rationale for providing these kinds of opportunities, there is a compelling realpolitik reason. Without training funded and supported by the United States and its allies and partners, Huawei and other Chinese tech companies will only increase their already strong influence over Indonesia’s—and the broader region’s—technology landscape.

The United States and its allies and partners have been missing in action on tech training in Indonesia and other key developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It is time for them to get back in the game.

Thu, 28 Jul 2022 00:10:00 -0500 en-US text/html https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/28/indonesia-china-huawei-tech-cybersecurity/?tpcc=onboarding_trending
Killexams : CNN Exclusive: FBI investigation determined Chinese-made Huawei equipment could disrupt US nuclear arsenal communications

By Katie Bo Lillis

On paper, it looked like a fantastic deal. In 2017, the Chinese government was offering to spend $100 million to build an ornate Chinese garden at the National Arboretum in Washington DC. Complete with temples, pavilions and a 70-foot white pagoda, the project thrilled local officials, who hoped it would attract thousands of tourists every year.

But when US counterintelligence officials began digging into the details, they found numerous red flags. The pagoda, they noted, would have been strategically placed on one of the highest points in Washington DC, just two miles from the US Capitol, a perfect spot for signals intelligence collection, multiple sources familiar with the episode told CNN.

Also alarming was that Chinese officials wanted to build the pagoda with materials shipped to the US in diplomatic pouches, which US Customs officials are barred from examining, the sources said.

Federal officials quietly killed the project before construction was underway.    The Wall Street Journal first reported about the security concerns in 2018.

The canceled garden is part of a frenzy of counterintelligence activity by the FBI and other federal agencies focused on what career US security officials say has been a dramatic escalation of Chinese espionage on US soil over the past decade.

Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure, shut down a high-profile regional consulate believed by the US government to be a hotbed of Chinese spies and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.

Among the most alarming things the FBI uncovered pertains to Chinese-made Huawei equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest. According to multiple sources familiar with the matter, the FBI determined the equipment was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defense Department communications, including those used by US Strategic Command, which oversees the country’s nuclear weapons.

While broad concerns about Huawei equipment near US military installations have been well known, the existence of this investigation and its findings have never been reported. Its origins stretch back to at least the Obama administration. It was described to CNN by more than a dozen sources, including current and former national security officials, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

It’s unclear if the intelligence community determined whether any data was actually intercepted and sent back to Beijing from these towers. Sources familiar with the issue say that from a technical standpoint, it’s incredibly difficult to prove a given package of data was stolen and sent overseas.

The Chinese government strongly denies any efforts to spy on the US. Huawei in a statement to CNN also denied that its equipment is capable of operating in any communications spectrum allocated to the Defense Department.

But multiple sources familiar with the investigation tell CNN that there’s no question the Huawei equipment has the ability to intercept not only commercial cell traffic but also the highly restricted airwaves used by the military and disrupt critical US Strategic Command communications, giving the Chinese government a potential window into America’s nuclear arsenal.

“This gets into some of the most sensitive things we do,” said one former FBI official with knowledge of the investigation. “It would impact our ability for essentially command and control with the nuclear triad. “That goes into the ‘BFD’ category.”

“If it is possible for that to be disrupted, then that is a very bad day,” this person added.

Turning doves into hawks

Former officials described the probe’s findings as a watershed moment. The investigation was so secret that some senior policymakers in the White House and elsewhere in government weren’t briefed on its existence until 2019, according to two sources familiar with the matter.

That fall, the Federal Communications Commission initiated a rule that effectively banned small telecoms from using Huawei and a few other brands of Chinese made-equipment. ”The existence of the investigation at the highest levels turned some doves into hawks,” said one former US official.

In 2020, Congress approved $1.9 billion to remove Chinese-made Huawei and ZTE cellular technology across wide swaths of rural America.

But two years later, none of that equipment has been removed and rural telecom companies are still waiting for federal reimbursement money. The FCC received applications to remove some 24,000 pieces of Chinese-made communications equipment—but according to a July 15 update from the commission, it is more than $3 billion short of the money it needs to reimburse all eligible companies.

Absent more money from Congress, the FCC says it plans to begin reimbursing approved companies for about 40 percent of the costs of removing Huawei equipment. The FCC did not specify a timeframe on when the money will be disbursed.

In late 2020, the Justice Department referred its national security concerns about Huawei equipment to the Commerce Department, and provided information on where the equipment was in place in the US, a former senior US law enforcement official told CNN.

After the Biden administration took office in 2021, the Commerce Department then opened its own probe into Huawei to determine if more urgent action was needed to expunge the Chinese technology provider from US telecom networks, the former law enforcement official and a current senior US official said.

That probe has proceeded slowly and is ongoing, the current US official said. Among the concerns that national security officials noted was that external communication from the Huawei equipment that occurs when software is updated, for example, could be exploited by the Chinese government.

Depending on what the Commerce Department finds, US telecom carriers could be forced to quickly remove Huawei equipment or face fines or other penalties.

Reuters first reported the existence of the Commerce Department probe.
“We cannot confirm or deny ongoing investigations, but we are committed to securing our information and communications technology and services supply chain. Protecting US persons safety and security against malign information collection is vital to protecting our economy and national security,” a Commerce Department spokesperson said.

US counterintelligence officials have recently made a priority of publicizing threats from China. This month, the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center issued a warning to American businesses and local and state governments about what it says are disguised efforts by China to manipulate them to influence US policy.

FBI Director Christopher Wray just traveled to London for a joint meeting with top British law enforcement officials to call attention to the Chinese threats.

In an exclusive interview with CNN, Wray said the FBI opens a new China counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. “That’s probably about 2,000 or so investigations,” said Wray. “And that’s not even talking about their cyber theft, where they have a bigger hacking program than that of every other major nation combined, and have stolen more of Americans’ personal and corporate data than every nation combined.”

Asked why after years of national security concerns raised over Huawei, the equipment is still largely in place atop cell towers near US military bases, Wray said that, “We’re concerned about allowing any company that is beholden to a nation state that doesn’t adhere to and share our values, giving that company the ability to burrow into our telecommunications infrastructure.”

He noted that in 2020, the DOJ indicted Huawei with racketeering conspiracy and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.

“And I think that’s probably about all I can say on the topic,” said Wray.

Critics see xenophobic overreach

Despite its tough talk, the US government’s refusal to provide evidence to back up its claims that Huawei tech poses a risk to US national security has led some critics to accuse it of xenophobic overreach. The lack of a smoking gun also raises questions of whether US officials can separate legitimate Chinese investment from espionage.

“All of our products imported to the US have been tested and certified by the FCC before being deployed there,” Huawei said in its statement to CNN. “Our equipment only operates on the spectrum allocated by the FCC for commercial use. This means it cannot access any spectrum allocated to the DOD.”

“For more than 30 years, Huawei has maintained a proven track record in cyber security and we have never been involved in any malicious cyber security incidents,” the statement said.

In its zeal to sniff out evidence of Chinese spying, critics argue the feds have cast too wide a net — in particular as it relates to academic institutions. In one recent high-profile case, a federal judge acquitted a former University of Tennessee engineering professor whom the Justice Department had prosecuted under its so-called China Initiative that targets Chinese spying, arguing “there was no evidence presented that [the professor] ever collaborated with a Chinese university in conducting NASA-funded research.”      
And on Jan. 20, the Justice Department dropped a separate case against an MIT professor accused of hiding his ties to China, saying it could no longer prove its case. In February, the Biden administration shut down the China Initiative entirely.   
The federal government’s reticence across multiple administrations to detail what it knows has led some critics to accuse the government of chasing ghosts.

“It really comes down to: do you treat China as a neutral actor — because if you treat China as a neutral actor, then yeah, this seems crazy, that there’s some plot behind every tree,” said Anna Puglisi, a senior fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology. “However, China has shown us through its policies and actions it is not a neutral actor.”

Chinese tech in the American heartland

As early as the Obama administration, FBI agents were monitoring a disturbing pattern along stretches of Interstate 25 in Colorado and Montana, and on arteries into Nebraska. The heavily trafficked corridor connects some of the most secretive military installations in the US, including an archipelago of nuclear missile silos.

For years, small, rural telecom providers had been installing cheaper, Chinese-made routers and other technology atop cell towers up and down I-25 and elsewhere in the region. Across much of these sparsely populated swaths of the west, these smaller carriers are the only option for cell coverage. And many of them turned to Huawei for cheaper, reliable equipment.

Beginning in late 2011, Viaero, the largest regional provider in the area, inked a contract with Huawei to provide the equipment for its upgrade to 3G. A decade later, it has Huawei tech installed across its entire fleet of towers, roughly 1,000 spread over five western states.

As Huawei equipment began to proliferate near US military bases, federal investigators started taking notice, sources familiar with the matter told CNN. Of particular concern was that Huawei was routinely selling cheap equipment to rural providers in cases that appeared to be unprofitable for Huawei — but which placed its equipment near military assets.

Federal investigators initially began “examining [Huawei] less from a technical lens and more from a business/financial view,” explained John Lenkart, a former senior FBI agent focused on counterintelligence issues related to China. Officials studied where Huawei sales efforts were most concentrated and looked for deals that “made no sense from a return-on-investment perspective,” Lenkart said.

“A lot of [counterintelligence] concerns were uncovered based on” those searches, Lenkart said.

By examining the Huawei equipment themselves, FBI investigators determined it could recognize and disrupt DOD-spectrum communications — even though it had been certified by the FCC, according to a source familiar with the investigation.

“It’s not technically hard to make a device that complies with the FCC that listens to nonpublic bands but then is quietly waiting for some activation trigger to listen to other bands,” said Eduardo Rojas, who leads the radio spectrum lab at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida. “Technically, it’s feasible.”

To prove a device had clandestine capabilities, Rojas said, would require technical experts to strip down a device “to the semi-conductor level” and “reverse engineer the design.” But, he said, it can be done.

And there was another big concern along I-25, sources familiar with the investigation said.

Weather camera worries 

Around 2014, Viaero started mounting high-definition surveillance cameras on its towers to live-stream weather and traffic, a public service it shared with local news organizations. With dozens of cameras posted up and down I-25, the cameras provided a 24-7 bird’s eye view of traffic and incoming weather, even providing advance warning of tornadoes.

But they were also inadvertently capturing the movement of US military equipment and personnel, giving Beijing — or anyone for that matter — the ability to track the pattern of activity between a series of closely guarded military facilities.

The intelligence community determined the publicly posted live-streams were being viewed and likely captured from China, according to three sources familiar with the matter. Two sources briefed on the investigation at the time said officials believed that it was possible for Beijing’s intelligence service to “task” the cameras — hack into the network and control where they pointed. At least some of the cameras in question were running on Huawei networks.

Viaero CEO Frank DiRico said it never occurred to him the cameras could be a national security risk.

“There’s a lot of missile silos in areas we cover. There is some military presence,” DiRico said in an interview from his Colorado office. But, he said, “I was never told to remove the equipment or to make any changes.”

In fact, DiRico first learned of government concerns about Huawei equipment from newspaper articles — not the FBI — and says he has never been briefed on the matter.

DiRico doesn’t question the government’s insistence that he needs to remove Huawei equipment, but he is skeptical that China’s intelligence services can exploit either the Huawei hardware itself or the camera equipment.

“We monitor our network pretty good,” DiRico said, adding that Viaero took over the support and maintenance for its own networks from Huawei shortly after installation. “We feel we’ve got a pretty good idea if there’s anything going on that’s inappropriate.”

Scouring the country for Chinese investments 

By the time the I-25 investigation was briefed to the White House in 2019, counterintelligence officials begin looking for other places Chinese companies might be buying land or offering to develop a piece of municipal property, like a park or an old factory, sometimes as part of a “sister city” arrangement.

In one instance, officials shut down what they believed was a risky commercial deal near highly sensitive military testing installations in Utah sometime after the beginning of the I-25 investigation, according to one former US official. The military has a test and training range for hypersonic weapons in Utah, among other things. Sources declined to provide more details.

Federal officials were also alarmed by what  sources described as a host of espionage and influence activities in Houston and, in 2020, shut down the Chinese  consulate there.

Bill Evanina, who until early last year ran the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, told CNN that it can sometimes be hard to differentiate between a legitimate business opportunity and espionage — in part because both might be happening at the same time.

“What we’ve seen is legitimate companies that are three times removed from Beijing buy [a given] facility for obvious logical reasons, unaware of what the [Chinese] intelligence apparatus wants in that parcel [of land],” Evanina said. “What we’ve seen recently — it’s been what’s underneath the land.”

“The hard part is, that’s legitimate business, and what city or town is not going to want to take that money for that land when it’s just sitting there doing nothing?” he added.

A complicated problem

After the results of the I-25 investigation were briefed to the Trump White House in 2019, the FCC ordered that  telecom companies who receive federal subsidies to provide cell service to remote areas — companies like Viaero — must “rip and replace” their Huawei and ZTE equipment.

The FCC has since said that the cost could be more than double the $1.9 billion appropriated in 2020 and absent an additional appropriation from Congress, the agency is only planning to reimburse companies for a fraction of their costs.

Given the staggering strategic risk, Lenkart said, “rip and replace is a very blunt and inefficient remediation.”

DiRico, the CEO of Viaero, said the cost of “rip and replace” is astronomical and that he doesn’t expect the reimbursement money to be enough to pay for the change. According to the FCC, Viaero is expected to receive less than half of the funding it is actually due. Still, he expects to start removing the equipment within the next year.

“It’s difficult and it’s a lot of money,” DiRico said.

Some former counterintelligence officials expressed frustration that the US government isn’t providing more granular detail about what it knows to companies — or to cities and states considering a Chinese investment proposal. They believe that not only would that kind of detail help private industry and state and local governments understand the seriousness of the threat as they see it, but also help combat the criticism that the US government is targeting Chinese companies and people, rather than Chinese state-run espionage.

“This government has to do a better job of letting everyone know this is a Communist Party issue, it’s not a Chinese people issue,” Evanina said. “And I’ll be the first to say that the government has to do better with respect to understanding the Communist Party’s intentions are not the same intentions of the Chinese people.”

A current FBI official said the bureau is giving more defensive briefings to US businesses, academic institutions and state and local governments that include far more detail than in the past, but officials are still fighting an uphill battle.

“Sometimes I feel like we’re a lifeguard going out to a drowning person, and they don’t want our help,” said the current FBI official.  But, this person said, “I think sometimes we [the FBI] say ‘China threat,’ and we take for granted what all that means in our head. And it means something else to the people that we’re delivering it to.”

“I think we just need to be more careful about how we speak about it and educate folks on why we’re doing what we’re doing.”

In the meantime, the “rip and replace” program has remained fiercely controversial.

“It’s not going to be easy,” DiRico said. “I’m going to be up nights worrying about it, but we’ll do what we’re told to do.”

This story has been updated to reference Wall Street Journal reporting.

The-CNN-Wire
™ & © 2022 Cable News Network, Inc., a WarnerMedia Company. All rights reserved.

CNN’s Sean Lyngaas contributed to this report.

Mon, 25 Jul 2022 08:13:00 -0500 By CNN en-US text/html https://localnews8.com/politics/cnn-us-politics/2022/07/24/cnn-exclusive-fbi-investigation-determined-chinese-made-huawei-equipment-could-disrupt-us-nuclear-arsenal-communications-2/
Killexams : Why China is able to Develop and Nigeria Cannot

Some Lessons from China’s Soft Power Approach

By Bola A. Akinterinwa

The People’s Republic of China, depending on what criteria are considered, can be rightly described as a developing or developed country, a great or a super power in waiting. In classical international relations, the fundamental difference between a great power in the 19th Century and 20th Century and a super power in the post-World War II era, is the capacity and capability to project one-self economically, politically, militarily, technologically, and culturally worldwide. Only the United States and the former Soviet Union met the criteria at the end of World War II,   and by force of necessity, the two of them emerged and imposed themselves on the international community and the whole world had to acquiesce to the development. As a result of perestroika and glasnost (openness and reconstruction), the Soviet Union destroyed itself through strategic miscalculation. The Soviet Union was disintegrated, thus leaving the US as the only existing super power. Russia, which succeeded the Soviet Union appears to be struggling to occupy the vacuum created.

   The minor and medium powers also exist. A minor power is one that is fairly able to satisfy its obligations in the conduct and management of international relations, as well as still provide the basic needs of the people. As regards the medium powers, they are essentially regional ‘influentials’, that is, the African conception of a ‘region’ as defined in Article 1, paragraphs (d) and (e) of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing The African Economic Community’, which has been integrated as part of the AU Act. In fact, Professor Akinwande Bolaji Akinyemi came up with the need for Nigeria to seek to establish and coordinate the Concert of Medium Powers (later Lagos Forum) in order to make Nigeria more relevant in the management of global affairs.

The point being made here is that China is a quiet master planner, a developed and developing nation which often presents itself ordinarily as a developing country and therefore as a Third World country. Vie Internationale argues that China is a developing nation not in the general conception of a Third World country but one still making efforts to Boost on its developed status. Vie internationale argues that Nigeria is neither under-developed nor developing. The notion of an under-development necessarily implies that the efforts at development are inadequate or that the stage attained, going by other standards, is below. We contend here that, when compared with China considered as a developing country, Nigeria is, at best, a non-starter and therefore a non-developing country.

  Without doubt, Western countries hide under the cover of macro-economic and militaro-industrialist factors to relegate China to the Third World or the group of truly poor and non-developing nations of the world. For any country of Africa to put itself as a Third World country at the same level with China is simply to engage in serious strategic miscalculation.

As noted in this column last week, a delegation of the Developing Countries Think Tanks, comprising delegates from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Africa, Lebanon, Cambodia, etc, was invited by the International Department of the CPC. The recently established Bolytag Centre for International Diplomacy and Strategic Studies (BOCIDASS) and the Society for International Relations Awareness, represented by Bola A. Akinterinwa and Owei Lakemfa respectively, represented Nigeria on the delegation.

The delegation continued with its tour of different institutions and regions that play critical roles in the growth and development of China. Many observations came to my mind during the tour: emphasis on self-identity, Chinese mania of doing things, emphasis on self-reliance, friendship and hospitality of people at all levels. There is nothing like weekend of no work. The delegation was received on Saturdays and on Sundays by public officials i their offices. There is no European or African time. Any time fixed is time adhered to. The approach to all meetings was to present China, the province or the county to the delegation, with emphasis on achievements, readiness to relate with all the peoples of the world on the basis of win-win policy.

Perhaps more interestingly I began to understand gradually why China is able to develop on the basis of self-reliance and why Nigeria is not even on the path of qualifying to begin to develop. In other words, Nigeria is not really developing and does not even qualify to be called underdeveloped. As noted above, a developing nation is already positively engaged in efforts at improvement. An underdeveloped nation simply refers to a country whose service delivery to the people is below universally acceptable average, especially in terms of security of the stomach, safety of life and property, and protection of fundamental human rights. What describes Nigeria of today more appropriately is ‘non-developing’ or ‘under-developing,’ especially when compared with the state of development of various provinces and local government areas in China.

 First,  the different places the delegation was taken to clearly show that the Government of China has a well-defined focus and the necessary commitment required for its execution. I discovered that there is nothing that made China great or that can make it a superpower  that does not exist in Nigeria except. If it were not for governmental clairvoyance and political chicanery, there is no reason why Nigeria should not be great as a people and nation-state.

Without scintilla of gainsaying, most leaders in Nigeria are money-seeking and self-seeking essentially, especially those of them that are appointed into the membership of Governing Boards or Councils of government agencies and parastatals . Many of them cannot guide as required but are very good and quick in tainting existing achievements they meet on ground if not in completely destroying them. This observation is largely based on the experience from the General Ike Omar Nwachukwu-led Governing Council of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

When I took a look at what had been done and still being done in China to make the country great, and compared them with what I had tried to do for the NIIA, I simply had much pity for the people of Nigeria, and particularly for my generation, even though my generation cannot be said to be a wasted generation. What I tried to do was simply to go beyond what Professor Bolaji Akinyemi did in terms of infrastructural development of the NIIA by building a new international conference centre. It will be good for patriotic Nigerians to ask questions about the institute, about the international conference centre, about the raising of its standard in all ramifications.

 Questions should be asked because what makes China a model of self-reliance and enduring growth and development is precisely the philosophy of not accepting to operate below international standard in whatever is to be done officially. I decided to raise the bar by first of all applying the rules and regulations to the letter. Non-PhD holders were not only reminded that they would not be able to go beyond the grade level of a Senior Research Fellow. In other words, they would not qualify to be assessed for promotion to the professorial cadre. This policy was already put in place in the institute since the 1980s, In fact some Research Fellows were compelled to go to University of Lagos for doctoral education. Some academic members of the Governing Council who knew much about this fact opted to say nothing about the truth. The Council was interested in documentary evidence to justify my decision. This looks good but what is behind six is more than seven. Time will tell what exactly is after six. Meanwhile, no country can develop on the basis of the attitudinal disposition of the Ike Nwachukwu-led Governing Council.

What is happening to the international conference centre and the new Office of the Director General that I newly put in place? What about the new Office for the Chairman of the Governing Council? What about the Founders of the NIIA, as well as former Directors General who were honoured with the naming of halls, committee rooms after them? Signage that were paid for and installed and which all visitors to the institute commended, were removed by Mrs. Stella Abimbola Dada during her one month tenure as Director General, in the wrong belief that the legacy left by Bola A. Akinterinwa would be removed? The names of people like that of the first Director General of the NIIA, late Ambassador Lawrence Fabunmi, former Foreign Minister, Professor Akinwande Bolaji Akinyemi and Director General of NIIA, and those of founders of the institute were removed. Does the removal of any signage diminish the integrity of a founding father? Whenever I take a look at the video recording of the destruction of my photograph, I simply pray for the destroyer in sympathy, because the destruction or removal of whatever had been done in any public institution is at best pettiness, myopia, and of course, waste of public resources.

 In China, heroic people are respected and remembered. Their efforts are sustained with new and additional efforts. In Nigeria, they are defamed as a result of ignorance and weakness of mind. Even when people want to destroy anything, it should still be done with a bit of common sense. In the same vein, in worshiping God, it should still be done with common sense. God wants everyone to behave rationally. If destruction is done with the application of a little common sense, there will not be any need for wastages. Sooner or later, and under the Freedom of Information Act, the Institute will be called to explain by all the stakeholders. How the modern-day civil and public servants behave at the NIIA cannot help national development.

There is no policy of impunity in China. Nobody condones any act of serious indiscipline in China as it was easily done with the protection of the Governing Council at the NIIA. The people of China do not do that. They build and consolidate. They do not destroy. If Nigeria is to make progress, the attitudinal disposition towards objectivity of purpose must first be encouraged. Patriotism should be a desideratum. Nigeria and altruism must be the first priority in all undertakings of the citizens.`

 Explained differently, development should not simply be seen as the provision of infrastructure. It is essentially about the extent of integrity of the people. It is about the extent of capacity to defend the national interest. It is only in Nigeria that a Minister will go into the open to condemn Nigerians abroad in the belief that they had done something wrong, or if they had not done anything wrong, they would not have been mistreated. Most unfortunate, many Nigerians had been mistreated without just cause.

 Last week Tuesday, a French policeman killed one Chinese national in Paris. Within 24 hours following the incident, the Chinese living in Paris and environs not only demonstrated against what they called ‘cold murder’ of their compatriots, the Chinese Foreign Ministry also summoned the French ambassador in Beijing for explanation. The Chinese government did not wait to find out what offence he might have been committed to have warranted his being shot dead. The belief of the Chinese is that all Chinese residing in France are entitled to national protection of the host state and the national protection of China under both private and public international law.

 In Nigeria, diplomatic protection under the Vienna Conventions (Public International Law) and under Private International Law, particularly in terms of denial of justice, does not mean much. As a result, there is no strong umbilical cord tying the state and the people of Nigeria together. Patriotism therefore suffers. Anti-Nigeria sentiments then have more room to grow.

More disturbing is the issue of a 21-storey building, ‘Beijing House’, being planned to be built at the NIIA by the Chinese. For the purposes of greater cooperation in the area of research and development and with the ultimate objective of promoting better understanding between the NIIA and Chinese international relations research institutions, I made the need for a Beijing House at the NIIA known to the Chinese Consul General in Nigeria when he paid me a courtesy visit as NIIA Director General.

The suggestion had earlier been raised with our Chinese partners during our various joint seminars in both Nigeria and China. This matter was discussed to the most important level, making the request official and transferring all documents to the Government of Nigeria for ownership. The matter can be considered dead as it was the Chinese Consul General that was asking for where the NIIA was on the matter thereafter. The point is that every discussion, every decision, every declared intention, etc, is always taken seriously and officially by the Chinese.

When the Chinese partners of the NIIA were convinced that such a Beijing House could not but be relevant, especially when I took them round to see what the Germans and the British had done for the institute, and particularly how the Americans had played active part in the establishment of and donation of books to the institute at the initial stage, the Chinese had no basis to hesitate. They were quickly decided to examine the proposal but at the level of the Federal Government. It is better to leave the rest of the story to history to tell. However, why should anyone expect Nigeria to develop in this type of circumstance? The 21-storey building was designed to be fully funded by the Chinese. The architectural design was done and it was to cost about N7billion without the equipment.

 It should simply be noted here that no nation, no institution operates on the basis of don’t care attitude and still expects to grow and develop. What the Chinese are doing to the point of excellence, which can be easily done in Nigeria, but not done because of the kind of people who parade themselves as leaders but which they really are not, is simply identifying a national focus, pursuing it with commitment and involvement of the people at all levels, as well as predicating political governance on transparent accountability and self-reliant policies. This observation brings us to one major reason why China is developed and still developing.

Why China is Developed and Still Developing

China is a developing nation in spite of its current great power status. In light of this, we believe that all the countries hitherto described as ‘developing,’ should be re-designated as ‘non-developing countries.’ China is considered developing essentially because of its unwavering commitment to research and development, equity and fairness, creativity of purpose and involvement of the generality of the people of China in policy making. All the Chinese companies that are competing well internationally as at today (Huawei, China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), etc) devote the greater part of their attention to research and development. Apart from that, the people think beyond the box. They live in the future.

 For instance, the Huawei, does not allocate less than 10% of its income to research. Besides, of the 180,000 members of staff in the company, 80,000 of them, that is, 44.4%, are engaged in active research. The cardinal objective of research is to pave way for better understanding of societal problems, to enhance a better living. Research is one of the major dynamics of development in the First World. Research is a journey to the unknown. When the unknown becomes known, advantage is then taken of it in many ways. This is why several business entrepreneurs readily support research and development in advanced countries. The problem, however, is that private sector financing of research, and particularly, industrial research, is not a big deal in Nigeria.

Let us also look at another dynamics of development in China: the 12345 Public Service Hotline of Jinan from which lessons could also be learnt. The public service hotline centre was set up by the CPC ruling party on September 9, 2008 with only one telephone set and one staff to address all the people’s complaints and promptly too. Since then, more than 16 million calls have been received, on average daily calls of between 10,000 and 12,000. Unlike in 2008 when communication connections were done by telephone lines only, today is witnessing applications for information through mobile phones, text messages, etc.

The centre is open for duty for 24 hours daily without interruption. This is to ensure that any Chinese wishing to call can do so at any time convenient to them. The objective is also to help Boost the image of Government of China, as well as enhance national development and efficiency, and provide standardised service.

In terms of administrative authority, the 12345 centre is placed under the direct authority of the Mayor of the Jinan City, in the Shandong Province but supervised by the Inspection Committee and the news media. Great emphasis is placed on quality service and control through insistence on compliance with 8 criteria. In fact, in appreciation of the centre, it has been acknowledged as a ‘Model Service Centre.’

Three points are noteworthy at this juncture. First, operationally, citizens often call for four things. They call for information guide and 59% of the calls deal with questions that are quickly responded to. In this regard, for instance, an 8-year old Chinese telephoned to inquire about the direction from which wind is coming from. The second category deals with demands and they are appropriately sent to the desk officers in the relevant departments for answers. When such answers are responded to, answers are transmitted to the initial callers who would also later be contacted to find out the extent of his or her satisfaction. Many a time, the centre also calls the citizens to find out what their needs or complaints are. Thirdly, the usefulness of the centre is to the extent that the International Standard Organisation has used the centre as a special case study, thus reflecting the importance attached to the centre. 98.17% of the people of China are reported to have given the centre a high approval rating.

If 59% of the calls are information-driven, 31% are calls for inquiry and help, and only 6.2% are calls making suggestions, leaving only 3.8% for complaints, there can be no disputing the fact that bridging communication gaps between the governing authority and the governed is necessary in political governance in order to maintain peace. Nigeria has a Complaint Commission. Nigeria even has some telephone lines for emergency. However China’s approach to the issue is more serious than the way it is in Nigeria. So is the handling of anti-corruption in China more serious than the way it is in Nigeria.

In this regard, a political party does not need to be in power before engaging in creative projects like the 12345 centre. In fact, it is when one is in the opposition group that this type of project ought to be conceived, especially in preparation for the 2019 elections. For Nigeria to begin to develop, the needful has to be done ab initio.

Tue, 02 Aug 2022 12:00:00 -0500 en-US text/html https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/04/02/why-china-is-able-to-develop-and-nigeria-cannot/
Killexams : Will the Saudis help the U.S. beat Huawei?

Presented by the Council on Foreign Relations

Driving the Day

— A big win against China? A new cyber agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could boost Western goals of protecting telecom networks from Beijing’s hackers — but the details of the deal remain unclear.

HAPPY MONDAY, and welcome back to Morning Cybersecurity! I’m your host, Eric Geller, and today’s a big day — we’re officially debuting a new version of MC, focused on the forward-looking news you all love and know, but snappier, streamlined and even more actionable.

Everything you know and love about Morning Cyber is still here — our sharp analysis and exclusive news, a daily rundown of the day’s events and even a funny cyber tweet to round things out. But we’ve tightened our focus to make sure we’re bringing you only the biggest, most actionable news that you really need.

We want our newsletter to serve you, our loyal reader. Let us know what you think of this new format — what’s working and what could use some improvement. Email me ([email protected]) or my fellow MC fill-in host Maggie Miller ([email protected]).

And as always: Have any tips or secrets to share with MC? Or thoughts on what we should be covering? You can email us about those things, too. You can also follow @POLITICOPro and @MorningCybersec on Twitter. Full team contact info is below. Let’s dive in.

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The International Scene

TAKE THAT, HUAWEI — As President Joe Biden returns to Washington from his Middle East trip, U.S. and Saudi officials are beginning to implement a pair of cybersecurity agreements that the two countries announced during Biden’s visit to Jeddah.

One of the agreements is a cybersecurity partnership between CISA, the FBI and Saudi Arabia’s National Cybersecurity Authority. But the other — a deal between the U.S. and Saudi telecom agencies to foster private-sector collaboration on the rollout of 5G networks — could supply the U.S. a boost in its battle with China over the security of next-generation telecom networks.

As part of the deal, Saudi Arabia “will invest in new U.S.-led technology to develop and secure reliable 5G and 6G networks,” Biden told reporters in Jeddah. This technology, known as Open Radio Access Network or Open RAN, emphasizes interoperable, rather than proprietary, technologies, making it easier to combine pieces of different vendors’ infrastructure.

— Taking on the giant: Saudi Arabia’s support is a badly needed win for the U.S. in its efforts to promote Western 5G technology in a region where the Chinese vendor Huawei is dominant. “Huawei technology is widely deployed in the Middle East and due to Chinese government subsidies, it’s hard for other companies to compete,” said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity to candidly discuss the White House’s goals.

— Driving a hard bargain: Cloud-based Open RAN technologies carry significant cost advantages that should make them attractive in markets where Chinese subsidies would otherwise carry the day, the senior administration official said.

And it’s not just about phone networks: The 5G and 6G technology at the heart of the new U.S.–Saudi partnership could someday power all kinds of equipment. “The intention is to scale it to applications built on 5G which could include, for example, remote management of devices in the energy grid,” said the senior administration official.

But all we have so far are words. The official said the Saudis “have agreed to do a pilot Open RAN deployment” through the new partnership, and the White House fact sheet mentions a “significant” Saudi financial investment as part of a broader G7 infrastructure plan. But it’s unclear how big the pilot will be, how the Saudis will evaluate whether to proceed with more Western 5G purchases or what companies are involved.

At the White House

ON DECK FROM INGLIS — As National Cyber Director Chris Inglis staffs up, he’s moving forward with more than half a dozen projects that span the full range of the portfolio that Congress gave him. Here’s what he said he’s working on during a recent interview with your MC host, POLITICO’s Daniel Lippman and West Wing Playbook’s Alex Thompson:

— Put your money where your mouth is: Inglis’ team has issued guidance to agencies about “how they should think about cyber,” who’s accounting for agencies’ cybersecurity outcomes and how they’re budgeting for those goals.

— Supporting the private sector: Inglis and his aides are conducting a “sector-by-sector review” of the regulations issued by the agencies responsible for various critical infrastructure industries, as well as how those agencies see their responsibilities and the services they can offer to industry.

— Supply chain security: Inglis’ office is developing criteria to determine when certain technology should be considered too risky given its provenance, as well as launching still-unspecified “software security and resilience initiatives.”

Inglis is also contributing to Biden administration reviews of the cybersecurity components of all new infrastructure projects being funded by the bipartisan law that Congress passed last November. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg and Mitch Landrieu, Biden’s infrastructure coordinator, both want to ensure that these projects are cyber-secure for the long term, Inglis said, and they’ve “invited organizations like mine to the table to ensure that we describe those [security needs] upfront and that we build in whatever those attributes should be to the [initial spending] plan.”

How much does Biden focus on cybersecurity? “He is as focused on this as I think a president should be,” Inglis said.

— Read on: Inglis also discussed the lessons the administration learned about regulation from the TSA pipeline backlash and the initial speed bumps he faced in setting up his office.

On the Hill

KEEP AN EYE ON THEM — Now that the House has passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act, it’s time to see what the Senate keeps and what it jettisons in its version, setting up conflicts between the two chambers that will test lawmakers’ commitments to preserving their pet projects and priority amendments. As this process unfolds, here are some of the cyber-related amendments in the House bill that Pros should be watching:

— Encryption: A provision from Rep. Tom Malinowski (D-N.J.) and colleagues would ban the use of federal funding to “require, support, pay, or otherwise induce” tech companies to build backdoors in their encryption to help law enforcement decrypt data during their investigations. The encryption debate has been quiet for several years now, but people on both sides of the debate agree the resumption of hostilities could only be one tragedy away.

— Satellites: Malinowski, along with a bipartisan group of House members, inserted language requiring CISA to publish resources for protecting satellites from cyberattacks and requiring GAO to study the adequacy of federal cyber support to satellite operators. Legislative attention to the cybersecurity of space systems is growing, with Sens. Gary Peters (D-Mich.) and John Cornyn (R-Texas) introducing a related bill, S. 3511, in January.

— Suing over nation-state hacks: One amendment with broad bipartisan support would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to allow Americans to sue foreign governments for cyberattacks they launch. Past changes to the FSIA have been controversial, but with foreign government hackers responsible for so many breaches of U.S. companies, there’s clearly broad congressional support for creating a new legal tool to respond to them.

Pentagon

HELP WANTED — The Pentagon is looking for a new director for its Defense Innovation Unit, the team that short-circuits military bureaucracy to quickly integrate cutting-edge private-sector technology into Defense Department operations. Michael Brown, the unit’s current director, is leaving in September.

Cybersecurity is one of DIU’s six priority areas, with the unit adopting technology to defend Pentagon networks and break into enemy systems. DIU has also explored ways to speed up communications over cloud services, developing technology that could be useful for other agencies as well. The team has a partnership with CISA’s “innovation hub” to coordinate on the adoption of new technologies in areas ranging from mobile security to threat intelligence.

Tweet of the Day

Thought-provoking question from cyber firm founder Luke Stephens: “When you step back and take a look at cybersecurity on the whole, would you say the good guys are winning, or losing?”

Quick Bytes

Despite some embarrassing leaks, the TrickBot ransomware group remains a major threat. (CyberScoop)

A hacker released internal data from the video game company Roblox, including players’ personal information.

Chat soon. 

Stay in touch with the whole team: Eric Geller ([email protected]); Konstantin Kakaes ([email protected]); Maggie Miller ([email protected]); and Heidi Vogt ([email protected]).

Mon, 18 Jul 2022 02:00:00 -0500 en text/html https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-cybersecurity/2022/07/18/will-the-saudis-help-the-u-s-beat-huawei-00046280
Killexams : U.S. probes China's Huawei over equipment near missile silos

The Biden administration is investigating Chinese telecoms equipment maker Huawei over concerns that U.S. cell towers fitted with its gear could capture sensitive information from military bases and missile silos that the company could then transmit to China, two people familiar with the matter said.

Authorities are concerned Huawei (HWT.UL) could obtain sensitive data on military drills and the readiness status of bases and personnel via the equipment, one of the people said, requesting anonymity because the investigation is confidential and involves national security.

The previously unreported probe was opened by the Commerce Department shortly after Joe Biden took office early last year, the sources said, following the implementation of rules to flesh out a May 2019 executive order that gave the agency the investigative authority.

The agency subpoenaed Huawei in April 2021 to learn the company's policy on sharing data with foreign parties that its equipment could capture from cell phones, including messages and geolocational data, according to the 10-page document seen by Reuters.

The Commerce Department said it could not "confirm or deny ongoing investigations." It added that: "protecting U.S. persons' safety and security against malign information collection is vital to protecting our economy and national security."

Huawei did not respond to a request for comment. The company has strongly denied U.S. government allegations that it could spy on U.S. customers and poses a national security threat.

The Chinese embassy in Washington did not respond to the specific allegations. In an emailed statement, it said: "The U.S. government abuses the concept of national security and state power to go all out to suppress Huawei and other Chinese telecommunications companies without providing any solid proof that they constitute a security threat to the U.S. and other countries."

Reuters could not determine what actions the agency might take against Huawei.

Eight current and former U.S. government officials said the probe reflects lingering national security concerns about the company, which was already hit with a slew of U.S. restrictions in recent years.

For a timeline on the U.S. government’s trade restrictions on Huawei please click https://graphics.reuters.com/USA-CHINA/HUAWEI-TIMELINE/zgvomxwlgvd/

If the Commerce Department determines Huawei poses a national security threat, it could go beyond existing restrictions imposed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the U.S. telecoms regulator.

Using broad new powers created by the Trump administration, the agency could ban all U.S. transactions with Huawei, demanding U.S. telecoms carriers that still rely on its gear quickly remove it, or face fines or other penalties, a number of lawyers, academics and former officials interviewed by Reuters said.

The FCC declined to comment.

U.S.-China tech war

Huawei has long been dogged by U.S. government allegations it could spy on U.S. customers, though authorities in Washington have made little evidence public. The company denies the allegations.

"If Chinese companies like Huawei are given unfettered access to our telecommunications infrastructure, they could collect any of your information that traverses their devices or networks," FBI Director Christopher Wray warned in a speech in 2020. "Worse still: They'd have no choice but to hand it over to the Chinese government, if asked."

Reuters could not determine if Huawei's equipment is capable of collecting that sort of sensitive information and providing it to China.

"If you can stick a receiver on a (cellphone) tower, you can collect signals and that means you can get intelligence. No intelligence agency would pass an opportunity like that," said Jim Lewis, a technology and cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington D.C.-based think tank.

One move to address the perceived threat was a 2019 law and related rules forbidding U.S. companies from using federal subsidies to buy telecoms equipment from Huawei. It also tasked the FCC with compelling U.S. carriers that receive federal subsidies to purge their networks of Huawei equipment, in return for reimbursement.

But the so-called "rip and replace" deadline to remove and destroy Huawei equipment completely will not kick in until mid-2023 at the earliest, with additional opportunities for companies to seek extensions. And reimbursements will only reach 40% of the total requested for now.

Towers near missile silos 

Cell towers equipped with Huawei gear that are close to sensitive military and intelligence sites have become a particular concern for U.S. authorities, according to the two sources and an FCC commissioner.

Brendan Carr, one of the FCC's five commissioners, said that cellphone towers around Montana's Malmstrom Air Force Base - one of three that oversee missile fields in the United States - ran on Huawei technology.

In an interview this week, he told Reuters there was a risk that data from smartphones obtained by Huawei could reveal troop movements near the sites: "There’s a very real concern that some of that technology could be used as an early warning system if there happened to be, God forbid, an ICBM missile strike."

Reuters was unable to determine the exact location or scope of Huawei equipment operating near military facilities. Individuals interviewed by Reuters pointed to at least two other likely cases in Nebraska and Wyoming.

Crystal Rhoades, a commissioner at Nebraska's telecoms regulator, has flagged to media the risk posed by the proximity of cell towers owned by Viaero to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in the western part of the state.

ICBMs carry nuclear warheads to targets thousands of miles away and are stored in underground silos near military bases. The Nebraska cell towers are near a missile field overseen by F.E. Warren Air Force Base in neighboring Wyoming.

Viaero provides mobile telephone and wireless broadband services to about 110,000 customers in the region. It said in a 2018 filing to the FCC opposing the commission's efforts at curbing Huawei's expansion that approximately 80% of its equipment was manufactured by the Chinese firm.

That gear could potentially enable Huawei to glean sensitive information about the sites, Rhoades told Reuters in June.

"An enemy state could potentially see when things are online, when things are offline, the level of security, how many people are on duty in any given building where there are really dangerous and sophisticated weapons," Rhoades said.

Rhoades said in July that she had not been updated on rip and replace efforts by Viaero in more than two years, despite requesting updated information from the company in recent weeks.

At the time of last contact, the company said it would not begin removal efforts until the FCC money became available.

The FCC advised companies on Monday how much of their funding requests it can reimburse.

Viaero did not respond to multiple requests for comment. Huawei also declined to comment.

In Wyoming, then CEO of rural carrier Union Wireless, John Woody, said in a 2018 interview with Reuters that the company's coverage area included ICBM silos near the F.E. Warren Air Force Base and that its equipment included Huawei switches, routers and cell sites.

Last month, Eric Woody, John's son and acting CEO, said "virtually all the Huawei gear Union purchased remains in our network." He declined to say whether the towers close to the sensitive military sites contain Huawei equipment.

F.E. Warren Air Force Base referred comment on the Huawei equipment to the Pentagon. The United States Strategic Command, which is responsible for nuclear operations, said in a statement to Reuters: "We maintain constant awareness of activities near our installations and sites." It noted that "any concerns are on a whole of government level" but declined to provide further details on what those concerns are.

New powers against foreign adversaries 

Rick Sofield, a former DOJ official in the national security division who reviewed telecoms transactions, said the Commerce Department probe could supply additional bite to the FCC’s crackdown but there was nothing new in targeting Huawei.

"The U.S. government’s concerns regarding Huawei are widely known so any information or communications technology company that continues to use Huawei products is assuming the risk that the U.S. government will come knocking," said Sofield, who represents U.S. and foreign companies facing U.S. national security reviews. He said he has not worked for Huawei.

The Commerce Department is using authority granted in 2019 that allows it to ban or restrict transactions between U.S. firms and internet, telecom and tech companies from "foreign adversary" nations including Russia and China, according to the executive order and related rules.

The two sources familiar with the Huawei investigation and a former government official said Huawei was one of the Biden administration's first cases using the new powers, referred to Commerce in early 2021 by the Justice Department.

The Justice Department referred requests for comment by Reuters to Commerce.

The subpoena is dated April 13, 2021, the same day that Commerce announced a document request was sent to an unnamed Chinese company under the new powers.

It gives Huawei 30 days to provide seven years' worth of "records identifying Huawei's business transactions and relationships with foreign entities located outside of the United States, including foreign government agencies or parties, that have access to, or that share in any capacity, U.S. user data collected by Huawei."

Noting that the "focus of this investigation is the provisioning of mobile network and telecommunications equipment...by Huawei in the United States," it also asks Huawei for a complete catalog of "all types of equipment sold" to "any communications provider in the United States," including names and locations of the parties to the sale.

Fri, 22 Jul 2022 19:00:00 -0500 en text/html https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/world/u-s-probes-chinas-huawei-over-equipment-near-missile-silos-8874111.html
Killexams : Making it in the megacity

I work at Kitty Annie, a beauty-technology company based in Shenzhen that was started in 2019. I arrived in Shenzhen in April this year, when people were able to travel again in China after coronavirus lockdowns eased.

This was a change of plan for me: I had moved home to Qingdao, a city on the east coast in Shandong province, after leaving London last September. I had intended to apply for PhD positions in England but began looking for positions closer to home because of COVID-19.

I like Kitty Annie. I enjoy being part of an entrepreneurial team. Every day is busy and full, and work takes up most of my life. We launched our first line of products this year, and we sell a body-hair removal kit and hair-removal gel. My job is to look for new ingredients to put in future products, and to continue development of our current ones. For example, I’ve recently been looking at compounds in strawberries, blueberries, blackberries and acai berries that could help to produce an anti-ageing effect when added to skin creams.

Yang says he enjoys the entrepreneurial environment at the beauty-technology firm Kitty Annie in Shenzhen. Credit: Wang Lei for Nature.

Yang says he enjoys the entrepreneurial environment at the beauty-technology firm Kitty Annie in Shenzhen. Credit: Wang Lei for Nature.

Every day is busy and full, and work takes up most of my life. We launched our first line of products this year, and we sell a body-hair removal kit and hair-removal gel. My job is to look for new ingredients to put in future products, as well as continue to develop current ones. For example, I’ve recently been looking at the properties in strawberries, blueberries, blackberries and acai berries that could help produce anti-ageing effects when added to skin creams.

We try not to test our formulas on animals, where possible. This is unusual in China.

To choose which ingredients to use, I explore published research in cosmetics, data from suppliers and the results of tests we order from external laboratories to come up with new formulas.

The city feels full of opportunity.

My master’s degree in structural and molecular biology at Imperial College London gave me a deeper understanding of what to look for when memorizing information about ingredients sent by manufacturers. I’ll look at the experiments they performed and evaluate whether their results seem reasonable. For example, I recently chose a blueberry extract, made in the Daxing’anling region in northern China, after reviewing materials from domestic sellers and overseas.

The main advantage of Shenzhen to me is the cuisine. The city attracts immigrants from other cities, and they’ve brought their top culinary skills. My favourite dishes are chopped pepper fish heads from Hunan province, pea noodles from Chongqing and donburi, which is a Japanese rice dish.

Jili Yang says Shenzhen is a great melting pot for different cuisines. Credit: Wang Lei for Nature.

Jili Yang says Shenzhen is a great melting pot for different cuisines. Credit: Wang Lei for Nature.

My home town of Qingdao is famous for its beautiful coastal scenery and temperate climate. In comparison, I find the weather in the southern city of Shenzhen rather hot and humid.

I hear a lot of negative opinions about living in Shenzhen: the city has grown rapidly and still has many problems and areas to be improved. Resources in areas such as education and health care are limited: people struggle to get access to good-quality social services.

But I think Shenzhen’s a great place for young people to work. The city feels full of opportunity. You can easily find work in exciting, emerging industries, such as Internet-based companies.

Jili Yang is a biologist at Kitty Annie in Shenzhen.

Wed, 04 Nov 2020 02:10:00 -0600 en text/html https://www.nature.com/immersive/d41586-020-03002-z/index.html
Killexams : White Paper on Operator Data Storage Power Index Released to Shape Future Data Infrastructure

This white paper is the first in the industry to systematically elaborate on research into operator data storage across multiple areas. It proposes five core indicators for measuring data storage capabilities, alongside a three-layer evaluation system for measuring these indicators. The paper also identifies four future trends in the target architecture for operator data storage. The paper is intended as a guide and reference for operators' digital infrastructure development in the digital economy era…

This white paper is the first in the industry to systematically elaborate on research into operator data storage across multiple areas. It proposes five core indicators for measuring data storage capabilities, alongside a three-layer evaluation system for measuring these indicators. The paper also identifies four future trends in the target architecture for operator data storage. The paper is intended as a guide and reference for operators' digital infrastructure development in the digital economy era.

Dr. Peter Zhou, Vice President of Huawei and President of Huawei Data Storage Product Line, believes that carriers are concerned about maximizing the value of data and measuring the effectiveness of data storage, management, and utilization within data infrastructure. Dr. Zhou pointed out that Huawei has invested heavily in data storage for more than a decade, and the company's data storage products have served over 400 operators in more than 150 countries and regions around the world. The Telco Operator Data Storage Power Index white paper is the result of close collaboration between Huawei and IDC, made possible through extensive communication with experts, customers, and partners in the industry. The paper aims to establish a system for evaluating data storage power, enabling operators to comprehensively assess their data infrastructure and ensure it becomes stable, reliable, and efficient.

Thomas Zhou, Vice President of IDC China, noted that 95% of operators have an urgent need to optimize their IT infrastructure. He added that the digital economy will logically lead to future digital infrastructure, and that storage power is a pillar of such infrastructure. Zhou went on to explain that this white paper focuses on five core capability indicators for the storage power of operators' data infrastructure: Security and Resiliency, Real-time Agility, Energy Efficiency, Intelligent Management, and Data Innovation. In addition, the paper establishes a three-layer evaluation system for measuring these capabilities, consisting of the operator region layer, data center layer, and storage device layer. The paper thus identifies four trends in the target architecture for operator data storage: core services on flash storage, massive distributed data, intelligent O&M, and storage as a service.

Through the study and evaluation of the core capability indicators for operators' data storage power, and by identifying future trends in operators' data management, the Telco Operator Data Storage Power Index white paper will help operators build higher-quality data infrastructure to achieve digital transformation and new growth.

The Win-Win·Huawei Innovation Week is held from July 18 to July 21 in Shenzhen, China. Together with global operators, industry professionals, and opinion leaders, we dive into subjects such as 5.5G, green development, and digital transformation to envision shared success in the digital economy. For more information, please visit: https://carrier.huawei.com/en/events/winwin-innovation-week.

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Mon, 18 Jul 2022 03:54:00 -0500 en text/html https://www.totaltele.com/513862/White-Paper-on-Operator-Data-Storage-Power-Index-Released-to-Shape-Future-Data-Infrastructure
Killexams : FBI claims Huawei could disrupt US nuclear arsenal

On paper, it looked like a fantastic deal.

In 2017, the Chinese government was offering to spend $144 million to build an ornate Chinese garden at the National Arboretum in Washington DC.

Complete with temples, pavilions and a 21-metre white pagoda, the project thrilled local officials, who hoped it would attract thousands of tourists every year.

Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure
Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure (AP)

But when US counterintelligence officials began digging into the details, they found numerous red flags.

The pagoda, they noted, would have been strategically placed on one of the highest points in Washington DC, just 3.2km from the US Capitol, a perfect spot for signals intelligence collection, multiple sources familiar with the episode told CNN.
Also alarming was that Chinese officials wanted to build the pagoda with materials shipped to the US in diplomatic pouches, which US Customs officials are barred from examining, the sources said.

Federal officials quietly killed the project before construction was underway.

The cancelled garden is part of a frenzy of counterintelligence activity by the FBI and other federal agencies focused on what career US security officials say has been a dramatic escalation of Chinese espionage on US soil over the past decade.

Since at least 2017, federal officials have investigated Chinese land purchases near critical infrastructure, shut down a high-profile regional consulate believed by the US government to be a hotbed of Chinese spies and stonewalled what they saw as clear efforts to plant listening devices near sensitive military and government facilities.

Among the most alarming things the FBI uncovered pertains to Chinese-made Huawei equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest.

According to multiple sources familiar with the matter, the FBI determined the equipment was capable of capturing and disrupting highly restricted Defence Department communications, including those used by US Strategic Command, which oversees the country's nuclear weapons.

While broad concerns about Huawei equipment near US military installations have been well known, the existence of this investigation and its findings have never been reported. 

Its origins stretch back to at least the Obama administration.

Music legend wakes from coma after hearing his song

It was described to CNN by more than a dozen sources, including current and former national security officials, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak publicly.

It's unclear if the intelligence community determined whether any data was actually intercepted and sent back to Beijing from these towers.

Sources familiar with the issue say that from a technical standpoint, it's incredibly difficult to prove a given package of data was stolen and sent overseas.

The Chinese government strongly denies any efforts to spy on the US.

Huawei in a statement to CNN also denied that its equipment is capable of operating in any communications spectrum allocated to the Defence Department.

But multiple sources familiar with the investigation tell CNN that there's no question the Huawei equipment has the ability to intercept not only commercial cell traffic but also the highly restricted airwaves used by the military and disrupt critical US Strategic Command communications, giving the Chinese government a potential window into America's nuclear arsenal.

"This gets into some of the most sensitive things we do," said one former FBI official with knowledge of the investigation.

"It would impact our ability for essentially command and control with the nuclear triad. "That goes into the 'BFD' category."

"If it is possible for that to be disrupted, then that is a very bad day," this person added.

the FBI uncovered pertains to Chinese-made Huawei equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest
the FBI uncovered pertains to Chinese-made Huawei equipment atop cell towers near US military bases in the rural Midwest (AP)

Turning doves into hawks

Former officials described the probe's findings as a watershed moment.

The investigation was so secret that some senior policymakers in the White House and elsewhere in government weren't briefed on its existence until 2019, according to two sources familiar with the matter.

That fall, the Federal Communications Commission initiated a rule that effectively banned small telecoms from using Huawei and a few other brands of Chinese made-equipment. 

"The existence of the investigation at the highest levels turned some doves into hawks," said one former US official.

In 2020, Congress approved $2.7 billion to remove Chinese-made Huawei and ZTE cellular technology across wide swaths of rural America.

But two years later, none of that equipment has been removed and rural telecom companies are still waiting for federal reimbursement money. 

The FCC received applications to remove some 24,000 pieces of Chinese-made communications equipment—but according to a July 15 update from the commission, it is more than $4.3 billion short of the money it needs to reimburse all eligible companies.

The FBI have been investigating Huawei's activities in the US
The FBI have been investigating Huawei's activities in the US (AP)

Chinese tech in the American heartland

As early as the Obama administration, FBI agents were monitoring a disturbing pattern along stretches of Interstate 25 in Colorado and Montana, and on arteries into Nebraska.

The heavily trafficked corridor connects some of the most secretive military installations in the US, including an archipelago of nuclear missile silos.

For years, small, rural telecom providers had been installing cheaper, Chinese-made routers and other technology atop cell towers up and down I-25 and elsewhere in the region.

Across much of these sparsely populated swaths of the west, these smaller carriers are the only option for cell coverage.

And many of them turned to Huawei for cheaper, reliable equipment.

Countries with the highest military expenditure in the world

Beginning in late 2011, Viaero, the largest regional provider in the area, inked a contract with Huawei to provide the equipment for its upgrade to 3G.

A decade later, it has Huawei tech installed across its entire fleet of towers, roughly 1000 spread over five western states.

As Huawei equipment began to proliferate near US military bases, federal investigators started taking notice, sources familiar with the matter told CNN. 

Of particular concern was that Huawei was routinely selling cheap equipment to rural providers in cases that appeared to be unprofitable for Huawei — but which placed its equipment near military assets.

Federal investigators initially began "examining [Huawei] less from a technical lens and more from a business/financial view," explained John Lenkart, a former senior FBI agent focused on counterintelligence issues related to China.

Officials studied where Huawei sales efforts were most concentrated and looked for deals that "made no sense from a return-on-investment perspective," Lenkart said.

"A lot of [counterintelligence] concerns were uncovered based on" those searches, Lenkart said.

By examining the Huawei equipment themselves, FBI investigators determined it could recognise and disrupt DOD-spectrum communications — even though it had been certified by the FCC, according to a source familiar with the investigation.

Cameras can track movement and send data back to service providers
Cameras can track movement and send data back to service providers (AP)

Weather camera worries 

Around 2014, Viaero started mounting high-definition surveillance cameras on its towers to live-stream weather and traffic, a public service it shared with local news organisations. 

With dozens of cameras posted up and down I-25, the cameras provided a 24-7 bird's eye view of traffic and incoming weather, even providing advance warning of tornadoes.

But they were also inadvertently capturing the movement of US military equipment and personnel, giving Beijing — or anyone for that matter — the ability to track the pattern of activity between a series of closely guarded military facilities.

The intelligence community determined the publicly posted live-streams were being viewed and likely captured from China, according to three sources familiar with the matter. 

Two sources briefed on the investigation at the time said officials believed that it was possible for Beijing's intelligence service to "task" the cameras — hack into the network and control where they pointed.

At least some of the cameras in question were running on Huawei networks.

Viaero CEO Frank DiRico said it never occurred to him the cameras could be a national security risk.

"There's a lot of missile silos in areas we cover. There is some military presence," DiRico said in an interview from his Colorado office.

But, he said, "I was never told to remove the equipment or to make any changes."

With CNN

Mon, 25 Jul 2022 11:34:00 -0500 text/html https://www.9news.com.au/world/fbi-huawei-equipment-could-disrupt-us-nuclear-arsenal-communications/987379f3-4b61-4f5e-adee-949926a70f66
Killexams : Huawei opens Melbourne store

The store features 40 innovative, high-tech, and aesthetically delightful PC, audio, and wearable products - that can be touched, tried, and purchased.

This includes brand new health-focused wearables like the Huawei Watch GT3 Pro in titanium and ceramic, the health-redefining Watch D which can monitor blood pressure, the stylish Watch Fit 2, and the upgraded ultra-thin Band 7, as well as the stylish Sound Joy portable speaker.

Lockdowns initially delayed Huawei's expansion plans but the new Huawei Authorised Experience Store has happily now opened, and can be found at G-153 The Glen Shopping Centre, 235 Springvale Rd, Glen Waverley, Victoria 3150.

Huawei Consumer Business managing director Dickson Yang said Huawei has ambitious long-term goals in Australia and plans to open more stores across the country. “The objective has always been to grow our presence in Australia, but due to the pandemic, our expansion was slightly stunted but now that the future looks bright, we are looking to expand into other states if there are no major disruptions," he said.

“Huawei listens to our consumers and we want to make our market-leading products easily accessible to all Australians who value innovative technology, and we are excited to be bringing this experience to Melbourne consumers," Yang stated,

As well as enjoying the new store and experiences, Melbourne shoppers can take advantage of Huawei's end-of-financial-year offers with discounts and offers across a range of wearables, audio, and PCs from now through to 20 July 2022.

Thu, 07 Jul 2022 05:42:00 -0500 en-gb text/html https://itwire.com/business-it-news/hardware-and-storage/resellers/huawei-opens-melbourne-store.html
Killexams : Drip Irrigation Market Size | Share | Trends | Growth | Scope | Forecast 2022 Analysis by 2029-VMR

The MarketWatch News Department was not involved in the creation of this content.

Jul 31, 2022 (Heraldkeepers) -- New Jersey, United States,- The Global Drip Irrigation Market research includes an in-depth analysis of key geographical trends, market dynamics, and global size estimates for the market industry. Product description, product classification, industry structure, and numerous participants in the Global Drip Irrigation market. For each segment and geographic market, the market research contains figures from the previous period, as well as the future term and percent CAGR measured.

The study focuses on global companies that operate in the Global Drip Irrigation Market and includes information such as company profiles, product samples and descriptions, capacity, production, value, and income. This study includes crucial facts on the industry's current situation and serves as a valuable source of guidance for businesses and individuals working in the market.

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The report highlights the latest trends in revenue and market progress, and all realistic statistics on ventures. It provides prevention and pre-planned management and highlights a summary of the global Drip Irrigation market, along with classification, definition and market chain structure. The Global Drip Irrigation Report highlights issues affecting the global Drip Irrigation market, including gross margin, cost, market share, capacity utilization, income, capacity, and supply. It also highlights the future scope of the global Drip Irrigation market during the upcoming period.

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The Global Drip Irrigation Market Report estimates upfront data and statistics that make the report a very valuable guideline for individuals dealing with advertising, advisors, and industry decision-making processes in the global Drip Irrigation sales market. Provides regional analysis for Drip Irrigation market. This report provides essential data from the Drip Irrigation industry to guide new entrants in the global Drip Irrigation market.

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The global report shows details related to the most dominant players in the global Drip Irrigation market, along with contact details, sales and accurate figures of the worldwide market. Various data and detailed analysis collected from various trusted institutions of the global Drip Irrigation market are presented in the Global Drip Irrigation Research Report.

The major players covered in Drip Irrigation Markets:

Netafim, Rivulis Irrigation, Jain Irrigation Systems, The Toro Company, Valmont Industries, Rain Bird Corporation, Lindsay Corporation, Hunter Industries, Eurodrip S.A, Trimble, Elgo Irrigation Ltd, EPC Industry, Shanghai Huawei, Grodan, Microjet Irrigation Systems.

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Drip Irrigation market is divided by type and application. For the period 2022-2029, cross-segment growth provides accurate calculations and forecasts of sales by Type and Application in terms of volume and value. This analysis can help you grow your business by targeting qualified niche markets.

Drip Irrigation Market breakdown by Type:

? Porous Soaker Hose Systems
? Emitter Drip System
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? Micro Misting Sprinklers

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? Agricultural Irrigation
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? Greenhouse Irrigation
? Others

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The regional analysis covers:

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Western Europe (Germany, U.K., France, Spain, Italy, Nordic countries, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg)

Eastern Europe (Poland and Russia)

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The study accurately predicts the size and volume of the market in the present and future. The report offers a comprehensive study of the Bass Mandolin industry and information on foreseeable future trends that will have a significant impact on the development of the market. The weekly then looks at the key global players in the industry.

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The study explores in depth the profiles of the main market players and their main financial aspects. This comprehensive business analyst report is useful for all existing and new entrants as they design their business strategies. This report covers production, revenue, market share and growth rate of the Drip Irrigation market for each key company, and covers breakdown data (production, consumption, revenue and market share) by regions, type and applications. Drip Irrigation historical breakdown data from 2016 to 2020 and forecast to 2022-2029.

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Our 250 Analysts and SME's offer a high level of expertise in data collection and governance using industrial techniques to collect and analyze data on more than 25,000 high-impact and niche markets. Our analysts are trained to combine modern data collection techniques, superior research methodology, expertise, and years of collective experience to produce informative and accurate research.

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Sun, 31 Jul 2022 15:16:00 -0500 en-US text/html https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/drip-irrigation-market-size-share-trends-growth-scope-forecast-2022-analysis-by-2029-vmr-2022-07-31
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